Monthly Archives: January 2007

Carrasco makes prospect list

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The folks over at Project Prospect rolled out their Top 100 in the minors list today, and the Phillies lone representative was Carlos Carrasco, coming in at #67. Carrasco is one of the younger members of the list, and realistically is probably the only Phillie who really deserves to be there at this point. Most of the guys on the list were taken pre 2006, so that would preclude Cardenas and Drabek, but with strong seasons, all three have a shot to make the list in 2007. Project Prospect is a cool site for general prospect info, including position breakdowns….check’em out.

2002 Draft Report Card, Part 1

2002 Draft Review

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Only 4.5 years late, right? Well, not really, this is just another idea I came up with. It’s my firm belief (I’m sure it won’t be a shock, considering I’m running this site) that the best way to build your team is from within, and then supplement your homegrown core with talent from the outside in areas where you are weak. Many teams have done this (Cleveland, most recently) and the benefits are two fold. First, the cheapest talent is the kind you draft (or sign internationally) because you don’t have to give up anything (other than money) to acquire these players. Second, you have control of these players for 6+ years, which many times will take a player close to the peak of his production level. Now, before we go further, a quick qualifier. A strong farm system and a strong core of youth doesn’t always translate into wins. Cleveland, the example I gave above, has developed a really strong core of young players (Sizemore, Perralta, Lee, Martinez) but they struggled in 2006, though there is good reason to believe they were unlucky. However, the actual results of the team at the major league level is the last step of the process. As Phillies fans can see, with the likes of Cole Hamels, Ryan Howard, Brett Myers, Chase Utley, Jimmy Rollins and Pat Burrell, a strong young core sets your team up for years down the road, you just need a competent general manager to add the right complimentary pieces. Mark Shapiro might have failed there in Cleveland, or they might have just been unlucky.

So, that brings us to today’s essay. Players taken in the 2002 draft have now been in the Phillies system for 5 seasons (really 4.5, since players taken in June 2002 only had a half year, if they signed right away) so we can start to draw some conclusions about the draft and what might have been. I’m not looking for an avenue to bash our former GM Mr. Wade, because I really don’t know how much impact he had, many GM’s trust their scouting directors and their scouts, and just deal with issues like going above slot or avoiding a guy they perceive as a big injury risk. So, when reading my grades, consider them a grade of the entire Phillies drafting machine, not just one guy.

Here’s the way I’ll lay this out. I’ll break down the first 10 rounds of the draft, and then after that, just discuss the next ten picks together in shorter form, and do that until the final pick. I’m going to use a grading school similar to the 4.0 college grading system:

A = 4.0
A- = 3.5
B+ = 3.25
B = 3.00
B- = 2.75
C+ = 2.50
C = 2.00
C- = 1.75
D+ = 1.50
D = 1.25
D- = 1.00

For the first 10 rounds, I’ll give each pick a grade, then I’ll grade rounds 11-20, 21-30, 31-40, and 41-50 as a whole, with the letter grade above. Add then scores together, divide by 14, and we’ll have the final draft grade. Sounds like fun, huh? My criteria for determining the grade of each pick/round is pretty simple. 60% comes from the player’s performance. Did the guy perform well in the system? Was he a flop from the get go? Was he strong early and then struggled? 35% will come from the longevity of the player. Is he still in the system? Is he still in pro ball? Did he wash out after 1 year? If you’re drafting guys who play 1 season then quit baseball, you’re squandering resources. Maybe you can’t know that before hand, but that’s why you do your homework on these guys, and that’s why area scouts and crosscheckers get paid to watch high school kids play. The final 5% will come from the guys taken after the pick, and before the next Phillies pick, and basically any other wildcard criteria I choose to use. Did the Phillies pass up a kid who became a future star to draft someone who flopped? Again, maybe that was bad luck, but someone has to be accountable and this is my grading system, so they can deal with it! Ok, I got carried away there. Basically, this is just going to be a fun exercise for me, my grades really don’t mean anything, it’s just a fun way to look at the draft in more detail. The deeper the pick, the lower the expectations. In other words, if the Phillies get a major league contributor in the 25th round, they’ll be rewarded for it. Without further delay, let’s begin

1.17: Cole Hamels, LHP. How’s this for a start to your draft? Hamels’ history is well known, but for those who are a bit foggy, here’s how it happened. Hamels broke his arm his junior year of high school, and because of it, his draft stock dropped. He was considered a top 5-10 pick before the injury, and was considered very advanced for his age with much more polish than most high schoolers, and an already established changeup. When he broke his arm, despite a good senior year, he dropped in the first round and the Phillies gambled. The pick was questioned almost immediately, but the Phillies stood firm. Hamels, when actually on the field, was brilliant at every level and showed people why the Phillies were so in love with him. Hamels’ minor league numbers were video game like, but he was bogged down every season by a number of medical maladies until finally staying healthy (for the most part) in 2006. He pitched 181.1 innings in 2006 across 4 levels after having thrown a total of 152 innings from 2003-2005. After a slow start at the big league level, he turned it up a few notches and finished the season strong, posting a tremendous 9.86 K/9 rate and a solid 1.25 WHIP. Looking back, this was a huge gamble, and though people doubted the pick even mid way through May 2006, it looks like Hamels has proven worthy. Grade: A- The only reason it’s not a straight A is because Hamels still does have some injury/durability concerns, but if 2007 is a repeat of 2006, healthwise, this becomes an A.

2.17: Zach Segovia, RHP. Segovia was dominant in high school, including an astouding 150 strikeouts in 77.2 innings pitched his senior year. He already had a large, strong body build, a plus fastball and a plus slider, so the Phillies felt he had a decent amount of polish for a high school player. He had a scholarship to Florida but signed with the Phillies and was sent to the GCL. He started well, he performed well at Lakewood in 2003, and then he hit a common (at least it’s becoming) roadblock, in needing Tommy John surgery. The surgery has become common that it now isn’t looked at as a probable career ender, and some pitchers even thrive moreso after surgery. Segovia missed all of 2004 and was assigned to Clearwater in 2005. He struggled, but many attribute this simply to trying to rebuild arm strength and shake off the rust. He re-established himself in 2006, and all the qualities the Phillies liked about him pre draft came back to the forefront. He still projects as a back of the rotation starter/7th inning reliever, and his odds of making the big leagues and contributing is pretty good right now. His grade gets dropped 1 level because the Phillies had the chance to draft Brian McCann, who could be a cornerstone piece of the core, but chose a pitcher in this slot. There weren’t too many other options between this pick and the third round pick, so only one grade drop. Grade: B This was a good pick at the time, because Segovia flat out dominated in high school and had all the makings of a top flight pitcher. His role is still a bit cloudy, so he doesn’t get a B+ just yet.

3.17: Kiel Fisher, 3B Houston, we have a problem! The Phillies, to their credit, forsaw the Scott Rolen exodus and decided to try and fill the void by drafting multiple third baseman in hopes of adding some dynamic talent at a position they knew was weak across the board within the system. Fisher was a solid high school bat, he had great raw tools, the Phillies loved his swing, etc etc. Well, Fisher struggled from the get-go, and was forced to repeat the GCL in 2003, which isn’t a good sign early in your career, but isn’t the end of the world. In his second trip through the GCL, he lit it up with a .908 OPS, and was promoted to Batavia, where he put up a solid .874 OPS in 96 AB’s to cap the 2003 season. Things were looking good…..then trouble hit. Fisher sustained a lower back injury that required surgery, and he subsequently missed the entire 2004 season. Lower back injuries for position players (and anyone really) are bad news. Fisher came back in 2005 and spent the entire year at Lakewood. Unfortunatey he hit just .173 with a .443 OPS in 98 AB, and that proved to be his last action in professional ball. Grade: C-. Honestly, I think I’m being generous here. The Phillies drafted Fisher here based on need rather than raw talent, and I can’t say I agree with that philosophy so early in a draft. Between this pick and their 4th round pick, pitchers Rich Hill and Josh Johnson were picked, and both have huge upside, with both already showing flashes of brilliance in 2006, not to mention Jeff Baker, who at the time, was still playing third base, though he has since moved to the outfield in Colorado.

4.17: Nick Bourgeois, LHP. One word sums up this pick for me. Blech. The Phillies, in prior years, had kind of neglected left handed pitchers, but seemed to have a knack for plucking good right handers (Myers, Madson come to mind), but in 2002 they tried to focus more on lefties. Bourgeois was drafted out of Tulane as a junior, but his numbers were fairly unimpressive, even in his junior year, where he posted a 3.29 ERA with an 8.92 K/9 and 3.52 BB/9. The strikeouts were nice, the walks not so much. The Phillies, upon drafting Bourgeois, said they didn’t think he had top of the rotation stuff, but could be a good #4 or #5 starter. He didn’t have a ton of velocity (87-88, topped out around 90), but had a good 12-6 curveball. To me, at this point, this just seemed like a bad pick. The Phillies were admitting he didn’t have impact potential, he was already tabbed for the back of the rotation (normally you start with higher goals and end up here) and to me, in the 4th round, you have to do better. After being drafted, he went to Batavia and was fairly unimpressive in only 18 innings. Nevertheless, he was sent to Lakewood in 2003. The strikeouts were still there (8.84/9) but unforunately, the walks were there too (4.99/9) and the end result, a 4.42 ERA, was not good for a college age pitcher at Low A. Again, the Phillies promoted him in 2004, this time to Clearwater. The results were similar, but actually got worse, with a lower K rate (7.25/9) and a higher walk rate (5.09), with an ERA of 4.94. The result? He was released and picked up by Seattle. He struggled in 2005 for Seattle, and hasn’t pitched in pro ball since. Grade: D- I think my reasons are clear here. Low ceiling pick, poor results, out of the org in just 2.5 seasons. Not good at all. While the bluechippers aren’t plentiful in round 4, the Phillies had the chance to grab Delwyn Young, a solid 2B in the Dodgers org, as well as Hayden Penn, one of the better pitching prospects in the Orioles system, who went early in the 5th round.

5.17: Jake Blalock, 3B. Ah, Jake Blalock. This pick was the follow up to Operation Third Baseman that I talked about earlier with the Fisher pick. Blalock played shortstop in high school, but was drafted as a 3B mainly because of his size, with some feeling he’d outgrown the position. His biggest strength was his baseball pedigree, being the younger brother of Hank Blalock, a quality hitting prospect for the Rangers at the time, and the son of a baseball coach, Sam Blalock. The Phillies liked his physical tools and felt he could play 3rd, 1st, or RF, possibly even catcher. He had a scholarship to Arizona State, but opted to sign and was sent to the GCL. At this point, it looked like a solid pick. At the time, I felt he was a good value in the 5th round. He had position versatility, he had a lot of potential, but like every high school guy, he was a long way away. His first two seasons followed the normal path, that is GCL to Batavia, and the results (.669 OPS and .767 OPS) were less than inspiring. However, because of his youth and tools package, hope still remained. However, in 2004, it became clear that Blalock’s future would be in the outfield, which reduced his value somewhat, as his bat would be his main contribution. His 2004 was good, not great, with a .799 OPS at Lakewood…average on base (.350) and decent slugging % (.449), but you were kind of expecting more, especially now that he was playing the outfield. 2005, things took a turn in the wrong direction as he put up a .747 OPS at Clearwater. The plate discipline was still there (.359), but the power was completely gone (.388 slugging), and that was a big problem. Light hitting outfielders only survive if they play lights out defense (normally center field, Jake was always corner bound) or they steal a ton of bases (he stole 28 bases total from 2003-2005) so he was in trouble. Blalock was traded along with Rob Tejeda to Texas for Dave Dellucci right before the beginning of the 2006 season, and may have sealed his fate with a .711 OPS at doube A Frisco. I haven’t read up on his future, but I’d guess 2007 will be his last shot, or 2006 might have been it. Grade: B- Maybe I’m being generous here. Blalock looked real good as a high school prospect. Good background, good tools, high baseball IQ. Unfortunately, he just didn’t make it work. Grade drops to B- because two quality arms, John Maine and Scott Olsen, were taken in the 6th round before the Phillies next pick, though admittedly, a position player was probably needed here.

This concludes Part 1. Let’s do a quick recap:

Hamels: A-
Segovia: B
Fisher: C-
Bourgeois: D-
Blalock: B-

GPA: 2.4. That’s around the B- range. Part 2 will come either later today or tomorrow. If you have quibbles with my grades, let me know, if you make a convincing argument, you just might help Eddie Wade make the honor roll.

Tools vs Numbers, Old School vs New School

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Baseball America has resumed their top 10 lists with the Atlanta Braves today, and the Phillies are scheduled for January 10th. If you’re reading this site, you are clearly interested in the minor leagues and prospects, so I’m sure you already know plenty about Baseball America. For those who don’t, basically, they rely on the reports of scouting directors, individual area scouts, crosscheckers and other talent evaluators. They gather all of their info, look at the numbers, then rank their prospects based on all of that information. For people like you and me, it’s obviously one of the best resources available, because most people don’t have the time to go out and see hundreds of minor league games every year. However, when looking at players at the minor league level (and even the major league level), there are two sharply divided schools of thought: Tools (old school) vs Numbers (new school), and I’m not here to tell you which is right (both are right) and which is wrong (both are wrong), I’m just going to try to explain where I’m coming from with my analysis (ramblings) and thoughts.

When you get into this game, and by game I mean following minor leaguers, you have to understand what you’re looking at, and how others look at things. “Moneyball”, the book by Michael Lewis, really is about the economics involved with baseball, especially front office decisions, but it also introduced some casual fans to the work of Bill James, and along the same lines, it introduced (or at least rekindled) the debate of “tools” vs “production on the field”, which is especially important to minor league players.

Generally (and more closely related to position players), there are 5 conventional tools:

  • Hitting for average
  • Hitting for power
  • Running
  • Arm Strength
  • Fielding

If a player is excellent in all of those areas, he’s labeled a “5 tool player” by talent evaluators. If he’s good at 4 areas, he’s a 4 tool player, etc etc. Now, of those tools, some are more “skill oriented” and some are more physical trait oriented. For example, if you’re 5’10 and weigh 215 pounds, with a thick muscular build, chances are you aren’t going to be considered a speed demon. If you don’t have 30 stolen base potential, you lose one of your “tools” when you’re evaluated by scouts. If you don’t have a cannon arm, you’re not looked at as a right field candidate, and you lose another tool from your arsenal. Scouts use a scale to rate every tool, with a 20 being terrible (think Sal Fasano rounding second base), and 80 (think Ryan Howard’s power) being the best.

Ok, so what does that mean? When a scout watches a player, he immediately looks at those five areas. He makes notes about a player’s build and his “tools”, and this is important in the next area, projection. Projection is another scout buzz word, and it basically means “what can he become?”, and believe it or not, this is almost as important as what a player can actually do at the present time. This is much much more important when looking at high school players, because they are generally years, (2 or 3 at least, normally 4-6) away from making it to the majors when they are finishing high school. If you have two pitchers with identical numbers in high school, what generally separates them is their projection. For example, a kid who is 6’4, 180 pounds is much more projectable than a kid who is maybe 5’9, 150 pounds. On the pitching mound, they could have identical pitches, and put up identical statistics, but the scouts will favor the taller kid 95/100 times because of his projection. They look at the taller, skinnier kid and picture him growing 3 more inches and adding 50 pounds of muscle to his frame, and that means more potential velocity, a better downward plane on his pitches, and better durability.

Scouts rate players based on what they could become, also taking into account what they’ve done in high school, but again, more on what they can become. While you can definitely see the merit of this approach, it also helps explain why guys like James Happ, who I’ve discussed in my previous article, flies under the radar. He has good size, but he hasn’t added much velocity, and probably won’t in the future. Because he has lesser “stuff”, you can’t project him out to be a top of the rotation starter, despite his incredible consistency and otherwise solid numbers as a pro.

Back to my opening line regarding Baseball America’s Phillies list. Baseball America is driven by scouting reports of players. Scouts take notice of a guy’s numbers, but the old school approach is still very prevalent in the scouting world. To use a Phillies example, just look at Greg Golson. There’s a decent chance Golson will be ranked in the Phillies Top 10 list at Baseball America, and there’s an even better chance he ends up in the Top 15. If you look at his numbers, they really aren’t good. He was taken in the first round of the 2004 draft ahead of Phillip Hughes, now one of the top pitching prospects in baseball, because he was regarded as the best athlete in the draft. The general view of him was “incredible athlete, but raw baseball skills”, and boy were they right. Golson is fast, he has good raw power, he has a strong arm, but he really isn’t all that good at baseball. Lots of people can run really fast, but you don’t see many Olympic sprinters in the NFL, because it still requires skill and technical ability.

The old cliche “the hardest thing to do is hit a baseball” really does have some merit. Can you teach someone to have good plate discipline? Maybe. But it seems like the guys who “make it” at the big league level always had the skills, even if they didn’t have the “tools” that scouts obsess over. A scout would probably argue, on the other hand, that you can’t “teach a guy to run a 3.9 second 40 yard dash, but you can teach him to hit a curveball”….and well, they are probably right. Remember when I said that both sides were right and both were wrong? Here’s why. Scouts are correct when they say you can’t teach a guy to be a good athlete. And let’s face it, to play a sport like baseball at the highest level, you have to be at least a good athlete, and I’m convinced that guys like David Wells were once good athletes, even if they look like reserves on your Beer League softball team now. On the other hand, the more results oriented people point to guys like Greg Golson and say “if he can’t recognize a curveball, he’s never going to hit”, and if you believe Golson’s numbers represent his ability, they are right too. But because of guys like Greg Maddux (he’s short, he never threw 97 mph), we’ve learned there are always exceptions to every rule. The really smart people (or lucky I suppose) are the guys who can spot the Tom Gordon’s (short righthanders are frowned upon in the scouting world) and realize the skills are there, even if the tools aren’t.

The moral of the story? It’s quite simple, despite that long-winded diatribe above. If a player doesn’t have a good set of baseball skills, the odds of him making the big leagues, let alone being a good player, are pretty slim. If a guy doesn’t have at least one above average tool, the chances of him making the big leagues, let alone being a good player, are slim. So how can you tell? Well, that’s the thing, you really can’t. Baseball America, John Sickels, and just about every other talent evaluator out there has been wrong tons of times. Hey, I loved the Kyle Drabek pick in June, I think he could be the next big thing, but he could be out of baseball in 2 years.

Sometimes we don’t realize it, but to make it to the big leagues is a great accomplishment for any player, and at some point in your baseball life, you had to impress someone (more than likely a ton of people) to even get a shot, and even then, only the cream of the crop stick at the highest level. Every year, teams draft 50 guys or so in June. They take a few more (sometimes) in the Rule 5 draft, they sign 16 year old kids from the Dominican Republic, or they spend 51 million dollars to negotiate with guys from Japan. Some guys turn into superstars, a bigger group turn into good players, a bigger group turn into fringe guys who bounce between the majors and the minors, and the biggest group of them all never make it to the Show. When looking at any minor league player, whether it’s Felix Hernandez or Junior Felix, you have to remember that in reality, we’re all just projecting, we’re all just hoping, and we’re all just guessing. If you look at everything out there, including scouting reports and a player’s complete playing history, you can make a guess as to what he’s going to become. However, you also have to prepare yourself for the letdown of that player never making it and washing out of baseball.

You’ll have to forgive me, going back and re-reading what I wrote, I feel like I was channeling Bill Conlin, and I ended up straying off topic and getting lost in my own thoughts. I hope it was somewhat readable and you maybe got something out of it. Ah, who am I kidding, no one is reading this. Anyway, my original goal of this column was to predict what the Baseball America top 10 will look like, compared to my list. So, here’s my guess, in order. We’ll know next week how far off I was.

Carlos Carrasco
Kyle Drabek
Adrian Carenas
Michael Bourn
Josh Outman
Greg Golson
James Happ
Edgar Garcia
Jesus Sanchez
Matt Maloney

Last minute addition/thought. I think BA might go ahead and put Jaramillo on this list, based on his tools and his good showing the Arizona Fall League. He had a pretty modest 2006 regular season, but he’s always had a strong defensive reputation, and he hit well in Arizona, so he might have elevated his prospect status.

Destination Philadelphia: James Happ

Destination Philadelphia

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Destination Philadelphia is the corny nickname I’m going to give to a series of posts I plan to make highlighting different Phillies prospects that should push their way onto the big-league team sometime in 2007. Kicking off the inaugural version of this series is arguably the most polished pitching prospect in the Phillies system, James (JA) Happ. I’ve never spoken to the young man, so I don’t know if he prefers his friends to call him JA, but since I’m not his friend, I’ll just call him James. Happ turned 24 in October, which means his 2007 will be his age 24 season. Happ was drafted in the 3rd round out of Northwestern University in 2004, and had racked up several accolades as a college pitcher, including being the first Wildcat to be named to the All Big Ten team three years in a row. Upon leaving school, Happ ranked near the top of every category in school history for pitchers.

Happ’s freshman year of college, he was used primarily as a reliever, starting only 3 of 21 games in which he appeared. From 2003-2004, he started 28 games, threw 177 innings, posted a 3.10 ERA, and posted an impressive 200:66 strikeout to walk rate. Still, Happ flew under the radar a bit, having not pitched for a baseball juggernaut and not completely dominated in the Big Ten. The Phillies snatched him up in the 3rd round and assigned him to short season Batavia. He pitched just 32.2 innings, but was strong enough to put up a 2.02 ERA, allowing only 22 hits and striking out 37. The Phillies assigned him to Lakewood to start 2005, and he responded with a 2.36 ERA in 72.1 innings, again giving up fewer hits than innings (55 hits) and again striking out 70 in the 72 innings. Happ saw his control return to collegiate form, and more importantly, gave up only 3 HR. The Phillies game him 1 start in Reading at the end of the year, and he responded with 6 innings, allowing 1 run, striking out 8 and walking 2. To start 2006, the Phillies were a bit cautious, sending Happ to Clearwater. He pitched 80 innings, posting a 2.81 ERA, allowing 63 hits and 19 BB while striking out 77 and allowing a surprising 9 HR. He was promoted to Reading mid season, and his numbers actually improved. He pitched 74.2 innings at Reading, posting a 2.65 ERA, allowing 58 hits, 29 walks, and striking out an impressive 81 hitters, while allowing only 2 home runs. He capped his season by making one start at Scranton, pitching 6 innings, allowing 1 run (a home run) with 4 strikeouts and 1 walk.

So, now that we know who Mr Happ is and what he’s done, it’s time to figure out what he can do going forward. In his chat after the 2005 season, Baseball America’s Will Kimmey was asked about Happ, and he responded with these comments

A: Will Kimmey: Floyd breached the innings qualification (topping 50 in the majors for his career) with his final start. Blalock could still turn into a 25 HR per year guy because of his work ethic, and he’ll move one level at a time. Happ reminds the club of Randy Wolf in that he throws an average fastball by hitters up in the zone because of the deception in his delivery. He’s got great feel, as evidenced by his final start of the year in a promotion to Reading. He needs to tighten his slider.

Basically, this goes in line with most of the scouting reports on Happ in the past. He’s tall (6’6) and a bit wiry, yet he doesn’t have overpowering velocity, pitching mainly around 88-90. The comparison to Randy Wolf makes sense in some respects, because Wolf threw in the high 80’s, but he hid the ball well and could run his fastball by hitters up in the zone. Happ has an advantage over Wolf, because he is taller and can throw more on a downward plane. Nevertheless, let’s take a look at Happ’s numbers compared to Wolf’s. Wolf was drafted in the second round of the 1997 draft out of Pepperdine and like Happ, was assigned to short season ball. He pitched all of 1998 in the minors (AA and AAA) and he spent part of 1999 at Scranton before getting called up to the big team, and didn’t go back after (except to rehab), so he got to the majors quicker than Happ will. So, for comparison’s sake, we’ll look at both guys year by year numbers

Happ, 2004 (SS): 35.2 IP, 22 H, 18 BB, 37 K, 1 HR allowed
Wolf, 1997 (SS): 40.0 IP, 29 H, 8 BB, 53 K, 1 HR allowed
Happ, 2005 (A-): 72.1 IP, 2.36 ERA, 57 H, 26 BB, 70 K, 3 HR allowed
Wolf, 1998 (AA/AAA): 173 IP, 4.16 ERA, 182 H, 52 BB, 151 K, 16 HR allowed
Happ, 2006 (A+/AA): 160.2 IP, 2.70 ERA, 124 H, 49 BB, 162 K, 12 HR allowed
Wolf, 1999 (AAA/MLB): 199 IP, 4.79 ERA, 199 H, 96 BB, 188 K, 28 HR allowed

If we look at those numbers, the first thing we have to realize is that Wolf was moved much quicker and much more aggressively than Happ was. Wolf dominated in 2 seasons at Pepperdine, posting a 25-8 record, a 1.97 ERA and 328 K’s, the most in school history. Happ, as we talked about above, hasn’t been quite as dominant. That said, Happ is right on track, in terms of age and level in the system, to still be considered a prospect. Most minor league experts are hesitant to heap praise on Happ because he doesn’t have marquee “tools” like a blazing 95 mph fastball, a devastating changeup, or a nasty 12-6 curveball. That said, most are starting to come around on Happ and see him as a useful part. Lots of guys have gotten by without dominating stuff, but they have to be much more refined and their margin for error is smaller. The biggest asset Happ has, both over Wolf and over other guys like him with similar stuff, is his height. One of the biggest indicators of future success is a pitcher’s ability to get swings and misses, but also his ability to keep the ball in the park and not let batters get good swings on him. Happ does a pretty good job of getting swings and misses (9.09 K/9 in his career), but he does an even better job of keeping the ball in the park, allowing only 16 HR in 277 innings. In addition, he induced 199 groundballs, compared to only 155 flyballs and 57 line drives….that bodes well if he’s going to pitch half his games in Citizens Bank Park.

Now, the whole destination Philadelphia thing. At this point, it’s tough to figure out where Happ stands in the Phillies plans. Currently, the big club has six starters, with Jon Lieber figuring to be traded for fringe minor leaguers or a journeyman reliever. However, two members of the rotation have medical issues (Eaton, Hamels), one is 93 years old (Moyer) and one has off the field issues in his past (Myers), so there’s a pretty decent chance that all 162 starts this season aren’t coming from those five guys. With Gavin Floyd and Gio Gonzalez being sent to Chicago for The Chief, two roadblocks to Happ’s ascendancy have been removed. The Phillies do have three other viable options in Fabio Castro, Zach Segovia and Justin Germano, but the plans for the first two haven’t been decided, and it appears Germano will start the season in Ottawa. Castro and Segovia figure to be bullpen options and also emergency starter options, along with Happ. At this point, Happ’s numbers have been good against both lefties and righties, but he’s actually been better against righties (.615 OPS in 2006, compared to .664 against LHB) which means he really doesn’t profile as a LOOGY candidate. It seems he’d be best suited for a 6th inning role with the big league club if he isn’t starting, or he’d be better off just starting every 5 days at Ottawa. However, if he is going to be the first option to make a start, he might be kept at Reading because of the proximity to Philadelphia.

Happ, to date, has done nothing but pitch well, and he’s beginning to prove the doubters of his stuff wrong. Because he doesn’t overpower hitters, keeping the ball down and staying on top of his pitches will continue to be of the utmost importance to him going forward. Right now, by most accounts, his changeup is an above average pitch, while his curve is merely average. To succeed at the highest level as a starter, he’s probably going to have to sharpen his curveball a bit, but as a reliever, he’s probably more than capable now. The Phillies likely will add a veteran or two to the bullpen this winter, which means Happ will probably start somewhere in the minors, whether it be at Ottawa or at Reading, but he’s on the shortlist to head to Philadelphia, and if his past success translates forward, he could become a quite useful part.

ETA, June 2007